Three quick observations.

First, it was obvious that Halverson had long permanently decamped to Las Vegas and was not in good faith concerning her assertion that she was only temporarily absent OR WAS NOT TRUTHFUL WHEN SHE DECLARED LAS VEGAS TO BE HER PLACE OF RESIDENCE FOR VOTOR REGISTRATION PURPOSES;

Second, as with her recent yard nuisance appeal, she wrote the appeal brief in all caps—prompting a rebuke from the court of appeal; The court also noted that she otherwise failed to follow applicable court rules, and her brief (”appellants do not provide citations for many of the “facts” they state in their briefs as is required by California Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C)”), and engaged in borderline “contemptuous conduct” (”Appellants ignored our ruling and on January 20, 2004, they filed a reply brief that cites and relies on the material we declined to consider in our December 11, 2003 order.”)

Third, the judge is irresponsible.

(See Canon 2 of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct is particularly appropriate in this instance. It provides:

” Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge’s conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

“The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.***” “)

LaMacchia v. Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Bd., City and
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2004 WL 1161646
Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004.
May 24, 2004 (Approx. 1 page)

——————————————————————————–

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Elizabeth A. LA MACCHIA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RESIDENTIAL RENT STABILIZATION AND ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Nos. A102135, A102804.
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 324420).

May 24, 2004.

Stanley Goumas Hilton, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Kevin Scott Dickey, Office of City Attorney, Steven C. Williams, Wiggle & Fried, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Respondents.

JONES, P.J.
*1 Appellants Elizabeth and Antonette LaMacchia filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus challenging a decision made by the Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board of the City and County of San Francisco (the rent board) to increase their rent. The trial court denied the petition finding the rent board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Appellants now challenge that ruling contending (1) the rent board and trial court erred when it approved the rent increase, and (2) the court should not have awarded attorney fees and costs. We reject these arguments and affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Respondents John Tolosano, George Noceti, Jr., Mario Noceti and Hilda Faziola, FN1 each own or have an interest in an eight unit apartment complex located on Naglee Avenue in San Francisco. In October 1980, appellant Elizabeth LaMacchia signed a written agreement to rent an apartment in the complex. Elizabeth moved into the apartment and lived there continuously from October 1980 until April 1995, when she moved to Las Vegas, Nevada, in order to take a job as a judicial law clerk. Elizabeth anticipated the clerkship would be a one-year position, and she expected to return to San Francisco when it concluded. Therefore Elizabeth left much of her furniture in the apartment and she continued to pay rent.

FN1. The rent board is also a respondent. It has filed no briefs. Instead, it has filed a notice stating that it joins the arguments made by respondent landlords to the extent they are applicable.

The apartment remained vacant from April 1995 to December 1995 when Elizabeth sought and obtained permission for her sister Antonette to move in. Respondents asked Elizabeth and Antonette to sign a notice under section 6.14 (hereafter section 6.14) of the rent board’s regulations that would preserve respondents’ right to raise the rent should Elizabeth vacate the apartment ultimately. Elizabeth and Antonette agreed. The notice stated in part, “(1) When the last original tenant vacates the premises, the current tenancy for purposes of the Rent Ordinance will terminate. The landlord will then have the option of (a) recovering possession of the rental unit from any remaining occupants, or (b) creating a new tenancy for purposes of determining the rent under the Rent Ordinance.”

Antonette moved into the apartment on December 30, 1995, and she lived there continuously. However, her name was not added to the lease. Antonette always paid rent to Elizabeth, who in turn paid respondents.

Elizabeth did not return to San Francisco after one year. Instead, she continued to live and work in Nevada. Elizabeth registered her Nevada address with the California State Bar; she continued her California bar license on inactive status. She obtained a Nevada driver’s license, and in 1996 she registered to vote in Nevada. In May 1997, Elizabeth met her husband in Nevada, whom she married (in San Francisco) in February 1998. In December 1998, she purchased a single family home in Las Vegas where she and her husband now live.

Respondent Mario Noceti visited the Naglee Avenue apartment many times over the years in order to perform repairs. He noticed Elizabeth was never there. When he would ask when Elizabeth was coming back, Antonette would always say “soon.” Respondent Hilda Faziola had a similar experience. On at least five occasions since 1995, Antonette or her mother told Ms. Faziola that Elizabeth would be returning to San Francisco, “in a few months.”

*2 In June 2000, two respondents went to a seminar to learn more about their rights under San Francisco’s rent control ordinance. Based on information they obtained, on July 26, 2000, respondents served a notice on Antonette stating her rent would increase from $350 to $1,200 per month. Respondents said the increase was based on section 6.14 and on the fact that “the last original tenant has vacated the premises….”

Respondents returned to Elizabeth the $350 check she had sent to pay the August 2000 rent. Elizabeth has not paid rent to respondents since that date. Antonette began sending rent checks to respondents directly, paying the $1,200 monthly rent “under protest .”

In August 2000, [SRG NOTE—THIS IS NOW 4 YEARS AFTER SHE REGISTERED TO VOTE IN NEVADA AND 5 YEARS AFTER SHE LEFT THE APARTMENT] Elizabeth and Antonette filed a petition with the rent board alleging respondents had increased their rent unlawfully. The case was heard by an administrative law judge who issued a ruling in favor of appellants on February 28, 2001. Respondents appealed that decision to the rent board. That body reversed and remanded to the administrative law judge with instructions to “vacate the decision and find that, based on the facts in this case, the tenant has vacated the unit, having demonstrated no real indicia of an intent to return.”

The administrative law judge complied with the rent board’s order and entered a new decision on June 12, 2001. As is relevant here, the judge ruled respondents validly raised the rent because Elizabeth had vacated the apartment. As the judge explained, “Since Elizabeth, the last original tenant, has vacated the unit and Antonette … was properly and timely served with a Section 6.14 notice, the landlords are entitled to an unlimited rent increase. Therefore, the base rent increase to $1,200.00 effective August 30, 2000 is lawful.”

Appellants challenged the rent board’s decision by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition and denied it, filing a judgment to that effect on February 18, 2003.

On March, 26, 2003, respondents filed a motion asking the trial court to award them attorney fees and costs. While that motion was pending, appellants filed a notice of appeal from the February 18, 2003 judgment.

On April 22, 2003, the trial court entered an order awarding respondents $23,008.82 in attorney fees and costs.

On May 21, 2003, appellants filed a second notice of appeal to challenge the award of fees and costs.

This court has consolidated both appeals for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and decision.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Issues

Before turning to the merits, we must address a procedural issue. The briefs appellants have filed are deficient in several respects. The problems range from the visual impairment caused by printing appellants’ entire opening brief in capital letters, thus making it difficult to read, to serious omissions (appellants do not provide citations for many of the “facts” they state in their briefs as is required by California Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C)), to possibly contemptuous conduct.FN2 We point out these deficiencies not to be pedantic, but to highlight the importance of compliance with the California Rules of Court. The rules governing appeals exist to enable courts to resolve important issues in an efficient and predictable manner. When litigants ignore the rules, it makes our job more difficult, and it injects needless uncertainty into the appellate process. The court will expect and require appellants and their counsel to comply strictly with the rules governing appeals in all future filings with this court.

FN2. On November 12, 2003, appellants filed a request for judicial notice and a motion to augment the record. On December 11, 2003, we denied the request and motion on procedural and substantive grounds. Appellants ignored our ruling and on January 20, 2004, they filed a reply brief that cites and relies on the material we declined to consider in our December 11, 2003 order.

B. Whether the Rent Increase Was Valid

*3 Appellants contend the trial court erred when it denied their petition for a writ of administrative mandamus.

The purpose of a writ of mandate is to challenge the validity of an administrative decision. A trial court may grant the writ where the administrative agency prejudicially abused its discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) An abuse of discretion is shown if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, its decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b) .) Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the standard of review for the trial court and this court is the same: whether substantial evidence in light of the whole record supports the administrative decision. ( Getz v. City of West Hollywood (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 625, 627.)

Here, the rent board ruled respondents acted properly when they raised the rent on the Naglee Avenue apartment because Elizabeth, the original tenant, had vacated within the meaning of section 6.14. When Antonette moved into the apartment in December 1995, section 6 .14 stated in part, “(a) A tenant is any tenant residing at the premises with the landlord’s permission, toleration, passive consent, or per written or oral agreement with the landlord …. [¶] … [¶] (c) A landlord may reach a written agreement or serve written notice upon all of the tenant(s) as defined in subsection (a) above that when the last of the tenant(s) who meet the latter definition vacates the premises, a new tenancy is created for purposes of determining the rent under the Rent Ordinance….”

It is undisputed that Elizabeth was the sole original tenant under a written agreement executed in October 1980. Furthermore, the rent board held, and the evidence fully supports the conclusion, that when Antonette moved into the apartment in December 1995, Elizabeth and Antonette both signed a written notice to preserve respondents’ right to raise the rent should Elizabeth vacate ultimately. Thus the pivotal question is whether substantial evidence supports the rent board’s conclusion that Elizabeth “vacated” the apartment within the meaning of section 6.14. The answer is clearly yes.

Elizabeth moved to Nevada in 1995 in order to take a job as a judicial clerk. While Elizabeth may have intended to return to San Francisco initially, it is apparent that her plans changed. Her California bar license remained on inactive status. Elizabeth obtained a Nevada driver’s license, and since 1996 she has been registered to vote in Nevada. Elizabeth married and in December 1998, she and her husband purchased a home in Las Vegas where they now live. In sum, the evidence that Elizabeth “vacated” the Naglee Avenue apartment was not only substantial, it was overwhelming. Regardless of the reason Elizabeth registered to vote or continued her California Bar membership on inactive status, substantial evidence supports the rent board’s finding.

*4 Appellants attack the rent board’s decision on several grounds. First they contend the rent board should not have found that Elizabeth “abandoned” the property because respondents did not follow the procedures to establish abandonment that are set forth in Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.3. FN3 We reject this argument because neither the rent board nor the trial court ruled that Elizabeth had “abandoned” the property within the meaning of the Civil Code. Rather the rent board ruled Elizabeth had “vacated” her apartment within the meaning of section 6.14. The trial court affirmed that decision because it was supported by substantial evidence. The concept of “abandonment” is not relevant here.

FN3. Appellants actually cite Code of Civil Procedure sections 1951.2 and 1951.3. Those code sections do not exist. We presume appellants intend to rely on the analogous sections of the Civil Code.

Next, appellants contend the rent board “abused [its] discretion and exceeded [its] authority” when it ruled Elizabeth had vacated her unit. Appellants argument on this point is difficult to follow. Although appellants frame their argument as an attack on the rent board’s jurisdiction and the way it exercised its discretion, appellants in fact complain that the term “vacate” lacks a clear definition. According to appellants, the rent board “simply created a new ‘rule’ ex nihilo, out of thin air, by ipse dixit illogical reasoning.” Appellants darkly predict the end result of the rent board’s decision will be chaos. “[I]f any tenant ever had to be admitted to a hospital for an extended stay … that tenant could be deemed to have ‘abandoned’ his or her apartment solely by virtue of the fact that he or she was not physically present in the unit for the majority of time whilst in [the] hospital. [¶] Does this make sense? Does [the court] want to expel thousands of tenants from their homes just because they get sick and wind up in [the] hospital?”

Despite appellants’ hyperbole, the rent board’s action was well founded. An administrative agency is entitled to interpret its own regulations and that interpretation should be given great weight unless clearly erroneous. ( Lusardi Construction Co. v. California Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 639, 645.) The interpretation adopted by the rent board here was reasonable and was well within the bounds of its discretion. Furthermore, the result of the rent board’s decision will not be the displacement of thousands of tenants who have the misfortune to be hospitalized. There is a substantial difference between one who must be hospitalized because he or she is ill, and one who moves to another state, lives there for several years, takes a job, marries, and purchases a house.

Appellants’ next argument is also difficult to follow. As we understand it, appellants contend the rent board was somehow obligated to find in their favor under principles of waiver and laches. According to appellants, “One cannot sit on ones rights … and allow others to falsely believe that all is well. Nothing was hidden from the landlords. They had counsel. Counsel prepared the [section] 6.14 form signed by Elizabeth and Antonette in December 1995, 8 months after Elizabeth had moved to her new assignment. The landlords chose to do nothing. It is contra to law and to equity to allow them to withdraw their ‘consent’ tacit or not after more than five years without notice.”

*5 Laches is defined as an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right, causing prejudice to an adverse party such as to render the granting of relief to the other party inequitable. ( In re Marriage of Dancy (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148.) Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts. ( DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 60.) Here, the evidence shows that after Elizabeth moved, respondents asked Antonette and her mother repeatedly when Elizabeth would return. The answer was always “soon” or “in a few months.” The rent board was not required to find a waiver under these circumstances because evidence supported the conclusion that respondents did not know the true facts: i.e., that Elizabeth had “vacated” the property. Similarly, the rent board was not obligated to conclude that laches applied because evidence supported the conclusion that respondents acted reasonably. They did not enforce their rights under 6.14 immediately because they were told repeatedly, that Elizabeth would return.

In a related argument, appellants contend the rent board “exceeded [its] jurisdiction and abused [its] discretion” because it refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to find that respondents waived the right to claim Elizabeth had “abandoned” the unit. The doctrine of equitable estoppel involves the presence of four elements: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the other party must rely upon the conduct to his injury. ( Cole v. City of Los Angeles (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1369, 1374.) Where any one of the elements of equitable estoppel is absent, the claim must fail. ( Hair v. State of California (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 321, 328.) Here, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the parties to be estopped, respondents, were not aware that Elizabeth had moved permanently to Nevada. In addition, the evidence supported the conclusion that Elizabeth fully understood the true state of the facts; i.e., that she did not intend to return. Since the evidence supported the conclusion that two of the elements of equitable estoppel were not present, the rent board was not obligated to apply that principle. ( Id. at p. 328.)

Appellants’ next argument is based on the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ.Code, § 1954.50 et seq.) which preempts local rent control by permitting landlords to set the initial rent for vacant units. (Civ.Code, § 1954.53, subd. (a); DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 40-41.) Appellants contend the act could not be applied to their case because it was not in effect when Antonette moved into the Naglee Avenue apartment.FN4 We need not decide whether the Costa-Hawkins Act could validly be applied here because neither the rent board nor the trial court based its decision on that law. Rather, both based their decisions on section 6.14. The Costa-Hawkins Act was irrelevant.

FN4. Civil Code section 1954.53, subdivision (d)(1) states, in part, “nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the obligations of contracts entered into prior to January 1, 1996.”

*6 Finally, appellants contend that Antonette, as a tenant in a San Francisco apartment, was “entitled to full protection of the [San Francisco Rent Ordinance]” and therefore she could not be subjected to an unreasonable rent increase. While it may be true that Antonette was a tenant, and that tenants generally are protected against large rent increases, Antonette’s rights as a tenant also were subject to the restrictions set forth in section 6.14. As we have explained, that section allowed respondents to raise Antonette’s rent when Elizabeth, the original tenant, vacated the apartment. The primary case upon which appellants rely, Parkmerced Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 490, does not compel a contrary conclusion. The court there ruled that a tenant who had moved into her brother’s apartment and lived there for many years with the landlord’s knowledge was a tenant within the meaning of the San Francisco rent ordinance. ( Id. at p. 494.) The Parkmerced court did not consider or discuss section 6.14, the section that is controlling here. The case is inapposite.

We conclude the trial court properly declined to grant appellant’s petition for a writ of mandate.FN5

FN5. Appellants also contend the rent board’s decision violated their constitutional rights to “equal protection” “privacy” and to “travel.” While appellant’s mentioned these issues briefly in their opening brief, they did not develop their argument or cite any authority. Therefore, the issues are waived. ( Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384.) Appellants remedied this omission somewhat in their reply brief. However, we do not address arguments that are raised in that manner. ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10.)

C. Attorney Fees

Appellants contend the award of attorney fees and costs was “unjustifiable” “excessive” and “without jurisdiction.”

We reject most of these arguments because appellants never opposed the award of fees and costs in the court below. Therefore, they are barred from challenging the award on appeal. ( Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1.)

A jurisdictional argument can be asserted on appeal even if is not raised in the trial court. ( Keiffer v. Bechtel Corp. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 893, 896.) However, appellants’ jurisdictional argument faces a different barrier. The page in appellants’ opening brief where they apparently discuss their jurisdictional argument is missing. Respondents noted this omission in their brief, but appellants have done nothing to correct it.

To the extent we can deduce the basis for appellants’ jurisdictional argument, we reject it. Appellants apparently contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award fees and costs because appellants appealed the judgment denying the petition for a writ of mandate prior to the date on which the court filed its award. This argument ignores well settled law that a trial court “retains jurisdiction to entertain a motion for attorney fees despite an appeal….” ( Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1639.)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment denying the petition for a writ of administrative mandamus and order awarding attorney fees and costs are affirmed.

We concur: STEVENS, and SIMONS, JJ.

JUDGE ELIZABETH HALVERSON TOLD TO CLEAN YARD

“Embattled Clark County district court judge Elizabeth Halverson is facing more trouble. But this time it’s not related to her conduct in the courthouse, it’s because of her yard.

“Judge Halverson has been given until Friday to clean up her yard as part of a nuisance abatement case with the county. The county says Halverson has a yard full of trash, a stagnant pool and overgrown shrubs and weeds.

“County spokespersons say this has nothing to do with her ongoing fight with court administrators over courthouse rules and control.

“Halverson’s at the heart of recent controversy at the Regional Justice Center. She was temporarily banned from the courthouse this month after hiring private security guards who may have bypassed courthouse metal detectors.

“Most of her staff has quit amid complaints of name-calling and other improper treatment. The Nevada Supreme Court is looking into the case. ”

Source: News 3 Las Vegas

http://www.kvbc.com/Global/story.asp?S=6595327&nav=15MV

Prior related yard story here: http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2007/Jan-13-Sat-2007/news/11958767.html
(Jan. 13, 2007, “Judge’s yard judged a mess–County says ‘junk, trash and debris’ make Halverson’s house a nuisance”, Las Vegas Review-Journal)

I guess putting her husband under oath to determine if he was really cleaning up was not sufficient motivation for the ex-felon.

Can this story get any more comedic?